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Abstract
Adversarial perturbations are imperceptible changes to
input pixels that can change the prediction of deep learn-
ing models. Learned weights of models robust to such per-
turbations are previously found to be transferable across
different tasks but this applies only if the model architec-
ture for the source and target tasks is the same. Input
gradients characterize how small changes at each input
pixel affect the model output. Using only natural images,
we show here that training a student model’s input gradi-
ents to match those of a robust teacher model can gain ro-
bustness close to a strong baseline that is robustly trained
from scratch. Through experiments in MNIST, CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100 and Tiny-ImageNet, we show that our proposed
method, input gradient adversarial matching, can transfer
robustness across different tasks and even across different
model architectures. This demonstrates that directly target-
ing the semantics of input gradients is a feasible way to-
wards adversarial robustness.
1. Introduction
Deep learning models have shown remarkable perfor-
mances in a wide range of computer vision tasks [13, 26, 15]
but can be easily fooled by adversarial examples [25].
These examples are crafted by imperceptible perturbations
and can manipulate a model’s prediction during test time.
Due to its potential security risk in deployment of deep neu-
ral networks, adversarial examples have received much re-
search attention with many new attacks [2, 17, 3] and de-
fenses [22, 18, 14, 8, 31, 1] proposed recently.
While there is still a wide gap between accuracy on clean
and adversarial samples, the strongest defenses rely mostly
on adversarial training (AT) [7, 16, 23]. Adversarial train-
ing’s main idea, simple yet effective, involves training the
model with adversarial samples generated in each training
loop. However, crafting strong adversarial training samples
is computationally expensive as it entails iterative gradient
steps with respect to the loss function [12, 29].
To circumvent the cost of AT, a recent line of work ex-
plores transferring adversarial robustness from robust mod-
els to new tasks [10, 24]. To transfer to a target task, cur-
rent such techniques involve finetuning new layers on top
of robust feature extractors that were pre-trained on other
domains (source task). While this approach is effective
in transferring robustness across different tasks, it assumes
that the source task and target task models have similar ar-
chitecture as pre-trained weights are the medium of transfer.
Here, we propose a robustness transfer method that is
both task- and architecture-agnostic with input gradient as
the medium of transfer. Our approach, input gradient adver-
sarial matching (IGAM), is inspired by observations [27, 5]
that robust AT-trained models display visibly salient input
gradients while their non-robust standard trained models
have noisy input gradients (Figure 1). The value of input
gradient at each pixel defines how a small change there can
affect the model’s output and can be loosely thought as to
how important each pixel is for prediction. Here, we show
that learning to emulate how robust models view ‘impor-
tance’ on images through input gradients can result in ro-
bust models even without adversarial training examples.
The core idea behind our approach is to train a student
model with an adversarial objective to fool a discriminator
into perceiving the student’s input gradients as those from
a robust teacher model. To transfer across different tasks,
the teacher model’s logit layer is first briefly finetuned on
the target task’s data, like in [24]. Subsequently, the teacher
model’s weights are frozen while a student model is adver-
sarially trained with a separate discriminator network in a
min-max game so that the input gradients from the student
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and teacher models are semantically similar, i.e., indistin-
guishable for the discriminator model [6].
Through experiments in MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100
and Tiny-ImageNet, we show that input gradients are a fea-
sible medium to transfer robustness, outperforming finetun-
ing on transferred weights. Surprisingly, student models
even outperform their teacher models in both clean accu-
racy and adversarial robustness. In some cases, the student
model’s adversarial robustness is close to that of a strong
baseline that is adversarially trained from scratch. Though
our method does not beat the state of the art robustness, it
shows that addressing the semantics of input gradients is a
new promising way towards robustness.
In summary, the key contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• For the first time, we show that robustness can transfer
across different model architectures.
• We achieve this by training the student model’s in-
put gradients to semantically match those of a robust
teacher model through our proposed method.
• Through extensive experiments, we show that input
gradients are a more effective and versatile medium to
transfer robustness than pre-trained weights.
2. Background
We review the concept of adversarial robustness for im-
age classification and its relationship with input gradients.
2.1. Adversarial Robustness
We express an image classifier as f(x; θ) : x 7→ Rk
that maps an input image x to output probabilities for k
classes in set C, where classifier’s parameters is defined
as θ. Denoting training dataset as D, empirical risk min-
imization is the standard way to train a classifier f , through
minθ E(x,y)∼DL(x,y), where y ∈ Rk is the one-hot la-
bel for the image and L(x,y) is the standard cross-entropy
loss:
L(x,y) = E(x,y)∼D
[−y> log f(x)] (1)
With this training method, deep learning models typi-
cally show good performance on clean test samples but fail
in the classification of adversarial test samples. With an ad-
versarial perturbation of magnitude ε at input x, a model is
considered robust against this attack if
argmax
i∈C
fi(x; θ) = argmax
i∈C
fi(x+δ; θ) (2)
where ∀δ ∈ Bp(ε) = δ : ‖δ‖p ≤ ε. With small ε, adver-
sarial perturbation with p = ∞ is often imperceptible and
is the focus in this paper.
2.2. Input Gradients of Robust Models
Input gradients characterize how an infinitesimally small
change to the input affects the output of the model. Given
a pair of input and label (x,y), its corresponding input gra-
dient ∇xL(x,y) can be computed through gradient back-
propagation in a neural network to its input layer. For clas-
sification tasks, the input gradient can be loosely interpreted
as a pixel map of what the model thinks is important for its
class prediction.
It was observed [27] that robust models that are adver-
sarially trained display an interesting phenomenon: they
produce salient input gradients that loosely resemble in-
put images while less robust standard models display nois-
ier input gradients (Figure 1). [5] shows in linear mod-
els that distance from samples to decision boundary in-
creases as the alignment between the input gradient and
input image grows but this weakens for non-linear neural
networks. While these previous studies show that robustly
trained models result in salient input gradients, our paper
studies input gradients as a medium to transfer robustness
across different models.
Image Standard PGD7-
Trained
Horse
45
Car
56
Dog
64
Figure 1: Input gradients of (middle) a non-robust model
and (right) robust model on CIFAR-10 images. The non-
robust model undergoes standard SGD training with natural
images while the robust model is trained with 7-step PGD
adversarial examples.
3. Related Work
We review prior art on defense against adversarial exam-
ples and highlight those that are most similar to our work.
2
3.1. Adversarial Training
With the aim of gaining robustness against adversarial
examples, the core idea of adversarial training (AT) is to
train models with adversarial training examples. Formally,
AT minimizes the loss function:
L(x,y) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈B(ε)
L(x+δ,y)
]
(3)
where maxδ∈B(ε) L(x+δ,y) is computed via gradient-
based optimization methods. One of the strongest defenses
employ projected gradient descent (PGD) which carries out
the following gradient step iteratively:
δ ← Proj [δ − η sign (∇δL(x+δ,y))] (4)
where Proj(x) = argmin∈B(ε) ‖x−‖.
AT has seen many adaptations since its introduction. A
recent work [30] seeks to generate more effective adversar-
ial training examples through maximizing feature match-
ing distance between those examples and clean samples. To
smoothen the loss landscape so that model prediction is not
drastically affected by small perturbations, [19] proposed
minimizing the difference between the linearly estimated
and real loss value of adversarial examples. Another work,
TRADES [31], reduces the difference between the predic-
tion of natural and adversarial examples through a regular-
ization term to smoothen the model’s decision boundary.
3.2. Non-Adversarial Training Defense
Closely linked to our method, there is a line of work that
regularizes the input gradients to boost robustness. Those
prior art [21, 11] focus on using double backpropagation
[4] to minimize the input gradients’ Frobenius norm. Those
approaches aim to constrain the effect that changes at in-
dividual pixels have on the classifier’s output but not the
overall semantics of the input gradients like our method.
Several recent methods fall under the category of prov-
able defenses that seeks to bound minimum adversarial per-
turbation for a subset of neural networks [9, 20, 28]. These
defenses typically first find a theoretical lower bound for
the adversarial perturbation and optimize this bound during
training to boost adversarial robustness.
3.3. Robustness Transfer
There is a line of work that shows robustness can trans-
fer from one model to another. [10] shows that robustness
from adversarial training can be improved if the models are
pre-trained from tasks from other domains. Another work
shows that adversarially trained learn robust feature extrac-
tors that can be directly transferred to a new task by fine-
tuning a new logit layer on top of these extractors [24]. Cir-
cumventing adversarial training, these transferred models
can still retain a high degree of robustness across tasks. Un-
like our method, these two work require that the source and
target models both have the same model architecture since
pre-trained weights are directly transferred.
4. Input Gradient Adversarial Matching
Our proposed training method consists of two phases: 1)
finetuning robust teacher model on target task and 2) adver-
sarial regularization of input gradients during the student
models’ training.
4.1. Finetuning Teacher Classifier
The first stage involves finetuning the weights of the
teacher model ft on the target task. Parameterizing the
model weights as ψ, the finetuning stage minimizes the
cross-entropy loss over the target task training data (x,y) ∼
Dtarget:
Lψ,xent(x,y, ψ) = E(x,y)
[−y> log ft(x)] (5)
where x ∈ Rhwc for h×w-size images with c channels,
y ∈ Rk is one-hot label vector of k classes.
To preserve the robust learned representations in the
teacher model [24], we freeze all the weights and replace the
final logits layer to finetune. Denoting the frozen weights as
ψ† and the new logits layer as ψlogit, the teacher model fine-
tuning objective is
ψ∗logit = argmin
ψlogit
Lxent(z(x, ψ
†),y, ψlogit) (6)
where z(x, ψ†) represents the hidden features before the
logit layer. After finetuning the logits layer on the target
task, all the teacher model’s parameters (ψ) are fixed, in-
cluding ψlogit.
4.2. Input Gradient Matching
The aim of the input gradient matching is to train the
student model to generate input gradients that semantically
resemble those from the teacher model. The input gradi-
ent characterizes how the loss value is affected by small
changes to each input pixel.
We express the classification cross entropy loss of the
student model fs on the target task dataset Dtarget as:
Lθ,xent(x,y, θ) = E(x,y)
[−y> log fs(x)] (7)
Through gradient backpropagation, the input gradient of
the student model fs is
Js(x) := ∇xLθ,xent =
[
∂Lθ,xent
∂x1
· · · ∂Lθ,xent
∂xd
]
(8)
where d = hwc.
3
Correspondingly, the input gradient of the teacher model
ft is
Jt(x) := ∇xLψ,xent =
[
∂Lψ,xent
∂x1
· · · ∂Lψ,xent
∂xd
]
(9)
4.2.1 Adversarial Regularization
To achieve the objective of training the student model’s in-
put gradient Js to resemble those from the teacher model
Jt, we draw inspiration from GANs, a framework compris-
ing a generator and discriminator model. In our case, we
train the fs to make it hard for the discriminator fdisc to
distinguish between Jt and Js. The discriminator output
value fdisc(J) represents the probability that J came from
the teacher model ft rather than fs. To train fs to produce
Js that fdisc perceive as Jt, we employ the following adver-
sarial loss:
Ladv = EJt [log fdisc(Jt)] + EJs [log(1− fdisc(Js))] (10)
Combining this regularization loss with the classification
loss function Lxent in Equation (7), we can optimize through
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to approximate the opti-
mal parameters for fs as follows,
θ∗ = argmin
θ
(Lθ,xent + λadvLadv) (11)
where λadv control how much input gradient adversarial
regularization term dominates the training.
In contrast, the discriminator (fdisc) learns to correctly
distinguish the input gradients by maximizing the adversar-
ial loss term. Parameterizing fdisc with φ, the discriminator
is also trained with SGD as such
φ∗ = argmax
φ
Ladv (12)
4.2.2 Reconstruction Regularization
Apart from the adversarial loss term, we also employ a term
to penalize the l2 difference between the Js and Jt generated
from the same input image.
Ldiff = ‖ Js− Jt ‖22 (13)
Adding this term with Equation 11, the final training ob-
jective of the student model is
θ∗ = argmin
θ
(Lθ,xent + λadvLadv + λdiffLdiff) (14)
where λdiff determines the weight of the l2 penalty term
in the training.
Figure 2 shows a summary of IGAM training phase
while Algorithm 1 details the corresponding pseudo-codes.
disc
student
teacher
Figure 2: Training phase of input gradient adversarial
matching.
Algorithm 1: Input gradient adversarial matching
Input: Target task training data Dtrain, Learning rates for teacher
model ft, student model fs and discriminator fdisc: (α, β, γ)
for each finetuning iteration do
Sample (x,y) ∼ Dtrain
Lψ,xent ← −y> log ft(x) . Classification loss
ψlogit ← ψlogit − α∇ψlogitLψ,xent . Update teacher ft to
minimize Lψ,xent
for each training iteration do
Sample (x,y) ∼ Dtrain
Lψ,xent ← −y> log ft(x) . Classification loss for teacher
Jt ← ∇xLψ,xent . Compute teacher input gradient
Lθ,xent ← −y> log fs(x) . Classification loss for student
Js ← ∇xLθ,xent . Compute student input gradient
Ladv ← log fdisc(Jt) + log(1− fdisc(Js)) . Adversarial loss
Ldiff ← ‖ Js− Jt ‖22 . l2 penalty loss
θ ← θ − β ∇θ(Lθ,xent + λadvLadv + λdiffLdiff) . Update the
student fs to minimize Lθ,xent, Ladv and Ldiff
φ← φ+ γ ∇φLadv . Update discriminator fdisc to
maximize Ladv
4.3. Transfer With Different Input Dimensions
In the earlier sections, we assume that the input dimen-
sions of the teacher and student models are the same. Recall
that before finetuning, the teacher model ft was originally
trained on source task samples (xsrc,ysrc) ∼ Dsrc,xsrc ∈
Rdsrc where each xsrc is a hsrc × wsrc-size image with csrc
channels. In practice, the image dimensions may differ from
those from the task target, i.e., dsrc 6= dtar. To allow the gra-
dient backpropagation of the losses through the input gradi-
ents, we use affine functions to adapt the target task images
to match the dimension of the teacher model’s input layer:
4
x′tar = A · xtar +b (15)
where x′tar,b ∈ Rdsrc ,xtar ∈ Rdtar and A ∈ Rdsrc×dtar .
Subsequently, cross-entropy loss for the teacher model
can be computed:
Lψ,xent(xtar,ytar, ψ) = E(xtar,ytar)
[−y>tar log ft(x′tar)] (16)
Since affine functions are continuously differentiable,
we can backprop to get the input gradient:
Jt(xtar) = ∇xtarLψ,xent (17)
We use a range of such transformations in our experi-
ments to cater for the difference of input dimensions from
various source-target dataset pairs.
4.3.1 Input Resizing
Image resizing is one such transformation where the resized
image can be expressed as the output of an affine func-
tion, i.e., x′tar = A · xtar. In the case where the teacher
model’s input dimension is smaller than the student model,
i.e., dtar > dsrc, we can use average pooling to downsize the
image. A 2×2 average pooling is equivalent to resizing with
bilinear interpolation when dtar is a multiple of dsrc. Fig-
ure 3a shows how we use input resizing to generate the input
gradient from the teacher model. For cases of dtar < dsrc,
we use image resizing with bilinear interpolation to upscale
the input dimension before feeding into the teacher model.
For the source-target pair of MNIST-CIFAR, we can simi-
larly reduce the number of channels by averaging the RGB
values of the CIFAR images before feeding to the teacher
model (trained on MNIST).
4.3.2 Input Cropping
Cropping is another way to downsize the image to fit a
smaller teacher model’s input dimension, i.e., dtar > dsrc.
The cropped image is output of x′tar = A · xtar where A
is a row-truncated identity matrix. For input cropping, the
initial Jt would have zero values at the region where the im-
age was cropped out since those pixel values are multiplied
by zero. To prevent the discriminator from exploiting this
property to distinguish Jt from Js, we feed into the discrimi-
nator Jt and Js that are cropped to size dsrc. Figure 3b shows
how we use cropping to generate the cropped input gradient
from the teacher model.
4.3.3 Input Padding
In contrast to cropping, padding can be used for cases where
dtar < dsrc. With the same form of affine function x′tar = A ·
xtar, A is a identity matrix preppended and appended with
zero-valued rows. Figure 3c shows how we generate the
input gradient from the teacher model with input padding.
disc
teacher
(a) Input resizing
teacher
(b) Input cropping
teacher
(c) Input padding
Figure 3: Transformations to fit images to teacher model’s
input dimensions.
5. Experiments
We conducted experiments with IGAM on source-target
data pairs comprising of MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100
and Tiny-ImageNet. These datasets allow us to validate the
effectiveness of IGAM in transferring across tasks with dif-
ferent image dimensions. Unless otherwise stated, adver-
sarial robustness is evaluated based on l∞ adversarial ex-
amples with ε = 8255 ). IGAM’s hyperparameters such as
λadv, λdiff and fdisc for each experiment are included in the
supplementary material.
5.1. CIFAR-10 Target Task
In our experiments with CIFAR-10 as the target task, we
study two types of robustness transfer. The upwards trans-
fer involves employing IGAM to transfer robustness from
a smaller model trained on the simpler MNIST dataset to
a larger CIFAR-10 classifier. Conversely, the downwards
transfer experiments involve transferring robustness from a
200-class Tiny-ImageNet model to a CIFAR-10 classifier.
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5.1.1 Upwards Transfer
Setup CIFAR-10 is a 10-class colored image dataset com-
prising of 50k training and 10k test images, each of size
32 × 32 × 3. For the CIFAR-10 student model, we use a
Wide-Resnet 32-10 model with similar hyperparameters to
[16] and train it for 200 epochs on natural training images
with IGAM. The MNIST dataset consists of 60k training
and 10k test binary-colored images, each of size 28×28×1.
For the robust teacher model trained on MNIST, we also
follow the same adversarial training setting and 2-CNN lay-
ered architecture as [16] 1. The teacher model is finetuned
on natural CIFAR-10 images for 10 epochs before using it to
train the student model with IGAM. Since the input dimen-
sions of CIFAR-10 and MNIST are different, we average
pool pixel values across the color channels of CIFAR-10
images to get dimension 32× 32× 1 and subsequently cen-
ter crop them into 28× 28× 1 input images for the MNIST
teacher model. With this same input transformation, we also
finetune the final logit layer of a robust MNIST model on
CIFAR-10 images similar to [24] for 100 epochs, to com-
pare as a baseline (FT-MNIST). We also train a strong ro-
bust classifier, with 7-step PGD adversarial training like in
[16], with the same architecture as the IGAM student model
to compare.
Results In the face of adversarial examples, the IGAM-
trained student model outperforms the standard and fine-
tuned baselines by large margins (Table 1). Despite the
difference between the dataset domains and model archi-
tectures, IGAM can transfer robustness from the teacher to
the student model to almost match that from a strong ad-
versarially trained (AT) model. The IGAM student model
has higher clean test accuracy than the robust PGD7-trained
baseline which we believe is a result of using natural (not
adversarially perturbed) images as training data in IGAM.
We note that though finetuning was previously showed
to have positive results in transferring robustness across
relatively similar domains like between CIFAR10 and CI-
FAR100 [23], it fails to transfer successfully here. This
is likely due to the bigger difference between the MNIST
and CIFAR-10 dataset, as well as the requirement of a more
sophisticated model architecture for the more challenging
CIFAR-10 dataset.
5.1.2 Downwards Transfer
Setup Tiny-ImageNet is a 200-class image dataset where
each class contains 500 training and 50 test images. Each
Tiny-ImageNet image has dimension of 64 × 64 × 3. For
the robust teacher model trained on Tiny-ImageNet, we
1Robust MNIST pre-trained model downloaded from
https://github.com/MadryLab/MNIST challenge
Table 1: Accuracy (%) on clean and adversarial CIFAR-10
test samples with upwards transfer.
Model Clean FGSM PGD5 PGD10 PGD20
Standard 95.0 13.4 0 0 0
FT-MNIST 33.4 1.51 0.44 0.15 0.12
IGAM-MNIST 93.6 67.8 63.6 56.9 43.5
PGD7-trained 87.3 56.2 55.5 47.3 45.9
use a similar Wide-Resnet 32-10 model since it is com-
patible with a larger input dimension due to its global av-
erage pooling operation of the feature maps before fully
connected layers. We robustly train this teacher model
on Tiny-ImageNet, following the same adversarial training
hyperparameters in [16] where robust models are trained
with l∞ adversarial examples generated by 7-step PGD.
Before using it to train the student model with IGAM, the
teacher model is finetuned on natural CIFAR-10 images for
6 epochs. Since the input dimensions of CIFAR-10 and
Tiny-ImageNet are different, we resize the 32 × 32 × 3
CIFAR-10 images with bilinear interpolation to get dimen-
sion 64 × 64 × 3 for finetuning the teacher model. For the
IGAM student model, we use the same Wide-Resnet 32-10
model and hyperparameters as in § 5.1.1. We also finetune
the final logit layer of a robust Tiny-ImageNet model on
upsized CIFAR-10 images similar to [24] for 100 epochs,
to compare as a baseline (FT-TinyImagenet). We also in-
vestigate two more types of input transformation for IGAM
here. The first is a trained 3 × 3 transpose convolutional
filter, with stride 2, to upscale the CIFAR-10 images to size
64 × 64 × 3. This single transpose convolutional layer is
trained together with the teacher model while finetuning on
natural CIFAR-10 images. The second type of input trans-
formation is padding, as detailed in § 4.3.3, of which we
explore two variants: center-padding and random-padding.
Results With input padding or input resizing, the IGAM-
trained student model outperforms the standard and fine-
tuned baselines in adversarial robustness (Table 2). From
our experiments, using padding or resizing is more effec-
tive for downwards transfer of robustness, with slightly
better results for resizing. With the downwards trans-
fer, the student model can match the strong PGD7-trained
baseline even more closely than in the upwards transfer
case (Table 1). This is expected since the teacher model
was robustly trained in a more challenging Tiny-ImageNet
task and would likely learn even more robust representa-
tions than if it were trained on the simpler datasets like
MNIST. Compared to upwards transfer, the finetuning base-
line transfers robustness and clean accuracy performance to
a larger extent but is still outperformed by IGAM.
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Table 2: Accuracy (%) on clean and adversarial CIFAR-10 test samples with downwards transfer.
Model Clean FGSM PGD5 PGD10 PGD20 PGD50 PGD100
Standard 95.0 13.4 0 0 0 0 0
FT-TinyImagenet 77.2 37.7 33.9 28.0 24.9 23.0 22.5
IGAM-TransposeConv 93.2 65.0 58.8 44.5 32.4 22.4 18.7
IGAM-RandomPad 88.3 35.8 43.9 40.1 38.6 37.8 37.6
IGAM-Pad 87.9 51.6 52.2 46.6 44.0 43.0 42.5
IGAM-Upsize 88.7 54.0 52.5 47.6 45.1 43.5 43.0
PGD7-trained 87.25 56.22 55.5 47.3 45.9 45.4 45.3
5.1.3 Input Gradients
When comparing the input gradients of the various base-
line and IGAM models (Figure 4), we can observe that
there is a diverse degree of saliency. The IGAM models’
input gradients appear less noisy than a standard trained
model as what we aim to achieve with our proposed method.
Interestingly, the IGAM-MNIST model’s input gradients
have a degree of saliency despite the sparse input gradi-
ents from its FT-MNIST teacher model. For IGAM models
with a Tiny-ImageNet teacher, the more robust variants like
IGAM-Upsize and IGAM-Pad display less noisy input gra-
dients than the less robust IGAM-RandomPad and IGAM-
TransposeConv. More input gradient samples are displayed
in Figure 6 of the supplementary material.
5.2. CIFAR-100 Target Task
We further study IGAM performance in upwards transfer
of robustness with CIFAR-100 as the target task, MNIST
and CIFAR-10 as the source task.
5.2.1 Robustness Transfer
Setup CIFAR-100 is a 100-class colored image dataset
comprising of 50k training and 10k test images. Similar
to CIFAR-10, each image has a dimension of 32 × 32 × 3.
For the CIFAR-100 student model, we use a Wide-Resnet
32-10 model with similar hyperparameters as § 5.1.1 ex-
cept for the final logit layer, which has 100 instead of 10
class outputs. We train the student model for 200 epochs
on natural CIFAR-100 training images with IGAM. The ro-
bust MNIST teacher model used is similar to the one in
§ 5.1.1. For the robust CIFAR-10 teacher model, we also
follow the same adversarial training setting and architecture
as [16] 2. During IGAM training with MNIST as the source
task, the input transformation same as in § 5.1.1 is used to
resize CIFAR-100 images into 28 × 28 × 1 inputs for the
teacher model. No input transformation is used when the
source task is CIFAR-10 since its images have the same di-
mensions as CIFAR-100’s. The final logit layers of MNIST
2Robust CIFAR-10 pre-trained model downloaded from
https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10 challenge
and CIFAR-10 teacher models are finetuned for 10 and 6
epochs, respectively, on natural CIFAR-100 images before
been used to transfer robustness in IGAM. We also fine-
tune the final logit layer of a robust CIFAR-10 model on
CIFAR-100 for 100 epochs, to compare as a baseline (FT-
CIFAR10). We also train a strong robust classifier, with
7-step PGD adversarial training like in [16], with the same
architecture as the IGAM student model to compare.
Results Similar to our findings in § 5.1, IGAM-trained
models outperform standard and finetuned baselines in ad-
versarial robustness (Table 3). Expectedly, using CIFAR-
10 as the source task yields higher transferred robustness
than using MNIST for IGAM. Since CIFAR-10 is closer to
CIFAR-100 and more challenging than MNIST, the CIFAR-
10 teacher model likely has more robust and relevant repre-
sentations that are reflected as more robust input gradients.
We note that though CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 are the
most similar datasets in our experiments, the finetuned base-
line has lower clean accuracy and adversarial robustness
compared to IGAM models. Finetuned models’ weights are
frozen up until the final logit layer to retain learned robust
representations. While weight freezing maintains a degree
of robustness to outperform standard training, it may restrict
the model from learning new representations relevant to the
target task, explaining its lower clean accuracy. We believe
this restriction also explains its lower robustness compared
to IGAM since IGAM models are free to learn representa-
tions important for the target task.
Table 3: Accuracy (%) on clean and adversarial CIFAR-100
test samples.
Model Clean FGSM PGD5 PGD10 PGD20
Standard 78.7 7.95 0.13 0.03 0
FT-CIFAR10 49.3 17.2 15.3 11.7 10.5
IGAM-MNIST 73.16 41.41 33.09 23.35 17.67
IGAM-CIFAR10 62.39 34.31 29.59 24.05 21.74
PGD7-trained 60.4 29.1 29.3 24.3 23.5
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Figure 4: Input gradients of different models.
5.2.2 Compute Time
Compared to adversarial training, IGAM requires lesser
computational resources to train (Table 4). Even though
IGAM involves an additional discriminator update step on
top of standard training, the parameter size of the discrimi-
nator is much smaller than the classifier model. Moreover,
the input gradient of the teacher model can be pre-saved be-
fore IGAM to avoid its feed-forward computation to further
save time.
Table 4: Average wall-clock time per training epoch for
CIFAR-100 adversarial defenses.
Model 7-step PGD IGAM
Time (sec) 815 345
5.3. Tiny-ImageNet Target Task
We study if robustness can transfer through the input gra-
dient when the target task has significantly larger input di-
mensions than the source task, with experiments on Tiny-
ImageNet as the target task and CIFAR-10/100 as the source
task.
Setup For the robust CIFAR-10/100 teacher model, we
follow the same adversarial training setting and Wide-
Resnet 32-10 architecture as [16]. We use a similar Wide-
Resnet 32-10 model for the Tiny-ImageNet student model
due to its compatible with larger input dimension due to
its global average pooling layer. The robust CIFAR-10/100
teacher models are finetuned for 5 epochs on natural Tiny-
ImageNet images before being used for IGAM. Since the
input dimensions of Tiny-ImageNet and CIFAR-10/100 are
different, we study two types of input transformation to re-
shape the image dimension from 64×64×3 to 32×32×3
for finetuning the teacher model. The first is image resiz-
ing with bilinear interpolation (§ 4.3.1), which is equivalent
to a 2 × 2 average pooling layer with stride 2. The second
transformation is center-cropping as detailed in § 4.3.2. The
models’ adversarial robustness is evaluated based on 5-step
PGD attacks on test Tiny-ImageNet samples.
Results Similar to previous target-source task pairs,
IGAM can transfer robustness even to much more challeng-
ing dataset, to a degree to outperform the standard trained
and finetuned baselines (Figure 5). There is no visible dif-
ference in robustness transferred when using image resizing
or center-cropping as the input transformation.
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Figure 5: Accuracy (%) on clean and adversarial Tiny-
ImageNet test samples.
6. Conclusions
We showed that input gradients are an effective medium
to transfer adversarial robustness across different tasks and
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even across different model architectures. To train a stu-
dent model’s input gradients to semantically match those
of a robust teacher model, we proposed input gradient ad-
versarial matching (IGAM) to optimize for the input gradi-
ents’ source to be indistinguishable for a discriminator net-
work. Through extensive experiments on image classifica-
tion, IGAM models outperform standard trained models and
models finetuned on pre-trained robust feature extractors.
This demonstrates that input gradients are a more versatile
and effective medium of robustness transfer. We hope that
this will encourage new defenses that also target the seman-
tics of input gradients to achieve adversarial robustness.
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A. IGAM Hyperparameters
The IGAM hyperparameters are fined through grid
search through the same range of hyperparameter values
within each transfer task. We report the values of the IGAM
models whose results are reported in this paper for repro-
ducibility.
A.1. CIFAR-10 Target Task
IGAM-MNIST λadv = 1, λdiff = 100,
fdisc : 5 CNN layers (16-32-64-128-256 output chan-
nels) and updated once for every 10 classifier update
steps
IGAM-TranposeConv λadv = 1, λdiff = 10,
fdisc : 5 CNN layers (8-16-32-64 output channels) and up-
dated once for every 5 classifier update steps
IGAM-RandomPad λadv = 1, λdiff = 10,
fdisc : 5 CNN layers (8-16-32-64 output channels)
and updated once for every 5 classifier update steps
IGAM-Pad λadv = 2, λdiff = 20,
fdisc : 5 CNN layers (8-16-32-64 output channels)
and updated once for every 5 classifier update steps
IGAM-Upsize λadv = 5, λdiff = 10,
fdisc : 5 CNN layers (8-16-32-64 output channels)
and updated once for every 5 classifier update steps
A.2. CIFAR-100 Target Task
IGAM-MNIST λadv = 0.1, λdiff = 200,
fdisc : 5 CNN layers (16-32-64-128-256 output chan-
nels) and updated once for every 5 classifier update
steps
IGAM-CIFAR10 λadv = 2, λdiff = 10,
fdisc : 5 CNN layers (16-32-64-128-256 output chan-
nels) and updated once for every 10 classifier update
steps
A.3. Tiny-ImageNet Target Task
IGAM-CIFAR10-Resize λadv = 0.1, λdiff = 200,
fdisc : 4 CNN layers (8-16-32-64 output channels) and up-
dated once for every 5 classifier update steps
IGAM-CIFAR10-Crop λadv = 2, λdiff = 50,
fdisc : 4 CNN layers (8-16-32-64 output channels) and up-
dated once for every 5 classifier update steps
IGAM-CIFAR100-Resize λadv = 0.1, λdiff = 200,
fdisc : 4 CNN layers (8-16-32-64 output channels) and up-
dated once for every 5 classifier update steps
IGAM-CIFAR100-Crop λadv = 0.5, λdiff = 200,
fdisc : 4 CNN layers (8-16-32-64 output channels) and up-
dated once for every 5 classifier update steps
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Figure 6: Input gradients of different models.
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